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ANALYZING TEXAS ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION: IS
THE STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION
FORMAT VIABLE?
by
Richard Bunk*

T

HE original version of the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA)'
did not expressly regulate close corporations. 2 Subsequent amendments in 19733 and 1975, 4 however, sought to restate and clarify the Texas
law on this business format. 5 To satisfy the current statutory definition of
a closely held corporation, for example, a domestic company must elect
that status in its articles of incorporation while limiting corporate ownership to no more than thirty-five stockholders. 6 The shares of these individuals must have been privately acquired and constantly subject to
restrictions on transferability. 7 Corporations that satisfy these requirements may be referred to as "electing" or "defined" 9 close corporations.
Notwithstanding these amendments, several commentators have chal* B.A., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. Securities
Analyst, Texas State Securities Board, Austin, Texas. The author would like to thank William Didlake, Director of the Corporation Division of the Texas Secretary of State's Office;
J. Leon Lebowitz, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law; Harry Haynsworth,
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; and Seth Searcy, Director of
the Model Business Corporation Act Redrafting Project, University of Texas School of Law,
for their assistance.
1. 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 64, § 1, at 239.
2. See Bateman & Dawson, The 1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation
Act and the Texas Securities Act, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 951, 951 n.4 (1975). For a detailed
discussion of the history of the 1955 version of the Texas Business Corporation Act, see
Carrington, The Texas Business CorporationAct as Enactedand Ten Years Later, 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 609 (1965); Carrington, The History of the Proposed Texas Business Corporation Act,
4 BAYLOR L. REV. 428 (1952); Comment, The First Fie Years Under the Texas Business
Corporation Act, 12 BAYLOR L. REV. 401 (1960).
3. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 545, § 18, at 1495.
4. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 134, § 6, at 308.
5. See 8 F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS § 2.1 (1978); Bateman, The
1975 Amendments to the Texas Business Corporation and the Texas SecuritiesActs, 39 TEX.
B.J. 781 (1976). For a detailed discussion of these changes, see 20 R. HAMILTON, BusINESS
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 661, 676, 696-703 (Texas Practice Supp. 1979); Bateman & Dawson,
supra note 2, passim; Doty & Parker, Changes in the Texas Business Corporation Act and
Related Statutory Provisions, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1009 (1973); Kerr, ProposedAmendments to
Corporation Laws, 35 TEX. B.J. 1133 (1972); Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporation Law--Part I, 28 Sw. L.J. 641, 713-20 (1974); Comment, The Close Corporation andthe
New Texas Business Corporation Act, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 703 (1974).
6. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1(A)(1), (4) (Vernon 1980) [hereinafter cited
as TBCA].
7. Id arts. 2.30-l(A)(2)-(3). Restrictions on transferability may be imposed under
art. 2.22 or the more liberal provisions of art. 2.30-2(A)(2).
8. Id art. 2.30-1(A)(4)(E).
9. See Lebowitz, supra note 5, at 714.
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lenged the utility of specific TBCA provisions as well as the overall desirability of using the current defined close corporation format.' 0 These critics
charge that the present statute is an excessively complex, ill-structured
mixture of procedural and substantive elements that necessitates the drafting of many complicated documents.I I Inadequate statutory guidelines for
the exercise of management options, such as the appointment of provisional directors or dissolution of the company at will, may lead to such
imprudent use of these techniques that a close corporation may not qualify
for taxation as a corporation.12 More frequently, however, commentators
focus on the managerial flexibility statutorily available to both electing
and nonelecting TBCA corporations, in order to argue that the additional
options open only to electing corporations are of little significance to corporate planners. 13 In light of the fact that increased managerial latitude is
a major theoretical advantage of the defined close corporation, the statutory grant of similar license to nonelecting companies may diminish the
relative value and magnify the perceived disadvantages of the defined
4
close corporation format.'
To date, no study has compared and analyzed the actual exercise of the
options available in drafting the articles of incorporation for electing and
nonelecting Texas corporations.1 5 This Article attempts to fill this gap by
systematically assessing the frequency with which such options, including
the election of close corporation status, are actually used in a large sample
of recent Texas incorporations. In view of the controversy concerning
managerial freedom under the Texas Business Corporation Act, however,
a review of the statutory control options applicable to electing and
nonelecting Texas corporations precedes a discussion of the results of this
study.
10. See, e.g., F. ELLIOTT & R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, §§ 2.1-.2; R. HAMILTON, supra
note 5, § 697, at 39; Bateman & Dawson, supra note 2, at 975; Bromberg, Corporate Organizational Documents and Securities-Formsand Comments Revised, 30 Sw. L.J, 961, 970
n.20.5(B) (1976); Hamilton, Corporations,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 153, 18788 (1976).
II. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 697, at 39; Bromberg, supra note 10, at 970
n.20.5(B); Hamilton, supra note 10, at 187-88.
12. F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, §§ 2.1-.2.
13. See, e.g., id. § 2.2, at 83; Karjala, Special Close Corporation Legislation: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come and &one, scheduled for publication in vol. 58, no. 7 of lexas Law
Review.
14. See TBCA art. 2.30-1, Comment, at 205 (Vernon 1980); F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 83. See also note I1 supra and accompanying text.
15. A review of the literature reveals two studies, however, that have analyzed the use
of some drafting techniques. See generally SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, INCORPORATION PLANNING IN TEXAS (1977)
[hereinafter cited as INCORPORATION PLANNING]; Hayes, Iowa IncorporationPractices-A
Study: Introduction andPart1, 39 IOWA L. REV. 409 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hayes, Part
I]; Hayes, Authorization and Issuance of CapitalStock by the Iowa Corporation,39 IOWA L.
REV. 608 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hayes, Part 11]; Hayes, CorporationCake with Partnership Frosting,40 IOWA L. REV. 157 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Hayes, Part 111]; Hayes,
Stockholders' Rights in the Iowa Corporation,40 IOWA L. REV. 459 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Hayes, Part IPJ; Hayes, Directors and Officers in the Iowa Corporation-Conclusion,40
IOWA L. REV. 587 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Hayes, Part ].
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CLOSE CORPORATION

STATUTORY FLEXIBILITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ELECTING AND

NONELECTING TBCA CORPORATIONS

The current Texas statute permits considerable flexibility in the management of the internal affairs of a defined close corporation. For example,
shareholders can elect to manage the company without a board of directors. 16 Shareholder agreements may stipulate how certain corporate operations are to be handled, while the articles of incorporation define the
qualifications of all future stockholders. 17 When faced with a corporate
deadlock, these shareholders may seek the appointment of a provisional
director or use liberal dissolution provisions.' 8 Finally, shareholders may
commence judicial proceedings to prevent the loss of defined close corporation status. '9 The availability of these options has led at least one commentator to call the Texas''20 close corporation format a "valuable new
approach to incorporating.
While some commentators acknowledge that electing corporations may
derive certain advantages through the use of these provisions, 2 1 the majority point to specific provisions of the TBCA that they claim provide the
same type of managerial freedoms to nonelecting corporations. These critics first question whether the shareholder management provision of the
electing close corporation statute is of practical value. 22 This argument
emphasizes that the positions of incorporator, registered agent, and director, required under the general corporation statute, may be performed by a
single individual. 23 Since this individual may also be a shareholder in the
nonelecting company, critics contend that most Texas corporations may
enjoy parallel freedom in shareholder management without making the
formal election. 24 In addition, the shareholders in a nonelecting corporation may be given control over a broad spectrum of other general corporate functions, such as the contents of adopted corporate bylaws or the
power to call shareholder meetings. 25 Shareholders may also establish voting approval margins that differ from the statutory percentages necessary
to ratify certain corporate activities. 26 The delegation of such authority
theoretically should strengthen the nonelecting shareholders' control in
16.
17.

TBCA art. 2.30-1(G) (Vernon 1980).
Shareholder agreements are enforceable in a defined
See id arts. 2.30-1(B), -2.

close corporation regardless of their enforceability in a nonelecting corporation. Comment,
The New Texas Close CorporationLegislation: A Comparison with Floridaand Delaware,27
Sw. L.J. 340, 350 (1973).
18. See TBCA arts. 2.30-4, -5 (Vernon 1980).
19. Id art. 2.30-3.

20. Comment, supra note 17, at 355.
21.
22.

See, e.g., F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 83.
See generally TBCA art. 2.30-2 (Vernon 1980).

23. See id arts. 2.09(A)(2), .32(A), 3.01(A).
24. E.g., R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 2.5, at 86.
25. See TBCA arts. 2.23(A), .24(C), .28(A) (Vernon 1980). See generally Kerr & Wolf,
Shareholders' Meetings Under the Texas Business CorporationAct, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 713
(1965).
26. Ordinarily, a two-thirds vote of the outstanding shares is necessary to amend the

charter, to merge, or to dissolve the corporation. See TBCA arts. 4.02(A)(3), 5.03(B),
6.03(A)(3) (Vernon 1980). These voting margins can, however, be reduced to a simple ma-
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managing the company. 27 In fact, the results of this study lend some support to the contention that management and ownership may overlap significantly within nonelecting companies. 28 In the nonelecting corporate
context, however, this overlap neither relieves Texas corporations of their
obligation to satisfy various corporate formalities nor protects their participants from the liability that results from a failure to comply. 29 Thus, insofar as the shareholder management provision for electing corporations
addiappears to diminish these risks, the provision may be said to afford
30
tional protection that is not available to nonelecting corporations.
Other commentators on the close corporation statute question the value
of the shareholder agreement provision. 3' The argument notes that the
TBCA also permits nonelecting corporations to use their bylaws as a private means of regulating internal corporate affairs. 32 In addition, a broad
variety of other provisions permits the regulation of specific corporate activities. Large boards, for example, can conduct their business without formal meetings through telephone conferences or at regularly scheduled
meetings with increased quorum requirements. 33 The TBCA also currently countenances the use, by all Texas corporations, of voting trusts,
several stock series with different voting rights, limitations on preemptive,
cumulative, and stock transfer rights, as well as the issuance of multiple or
fractional shares. 34 If management is concerned about the security of the
directors' positions on the board, that group may be classified or limited in
size to the number of initial directors who can only be removed for
cause. 35 Similar concerns may call for the inclusion of provisions that indemnify corporate officials or the use of interested party provisions that
permit the corporation to deal with those persons in their individual capacities. 36 Alternatively, several of the board's powers, such as declaring divibe delegated to a
dends or calling for the repurchase of stock, can either
37
committee or limited by the articles of incorporation.
These latter provisions permit a great deal of control over the operation
jority or increased to unanimity depending upon the articles of incorporation. See id art.
9.08(A).
27.

See, e.g., O'Neal, Close Corporation Control Devices, 61 ILL. B.J. 118, 122 (1972).

28. See generally notes 64-74 infra and accompanying text; see also Lebowitz, supra
note 5, at 716-17.
29. For an analysis of the problem of piercing the corporate veil, see generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 979 (1971).
30. In fact, shareholder management is widely recognized as one of the most attractive
advantages of the defined close corporation format. See, e.g., F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON,
supra note 5, § 2.2, at 83.
31. See, e.g., Bromberg, supra note 10, at 971 n.21.
32. See generally TBCA art. 2.23 (Vernon 1980).
33. See id arts. 2.35(A), 9.10(B), (C).
34. Id. arts. 2.12(A), .13(A)(7), .22, .22-1, .29(A)(l)(a), .29(D), .30.
35. Id arts. 2.32(A), .33(A).
36. Id art. 2.02(A)(16); Bromberg, supra note 10, at 973-77. See generally Knepper,
Corporate Indemnbiqcation and Liability Insurance for Corporation Officers and Directors, 25
Sw. L.J. 240 (1971); Comment, Mandatory Indemnification of Corporate Officers and Directors, 29 Sw. L.J. 727 (1975); Comment, The Interested Director in Texas, 21 Sw. L.J. 794
(1967).
37. See TBCA arts. 2.03(C)-(D), .36(A) (Vernon 1980).
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of TBCA corporations; however, the same provisions are applicable to defined close corporations as well. 38 Their availability to both business for-

mats, therefore, narrows the inquiry on this point to the relative flexibility
of these two methods in obtaining informal agreement among the shareholders. When so focused, the language of the close corporation statute
provides the dispositive benefit. 39 Furthermore, since this statute provides
for. the enforcement of shareholder agreements among the participants in a
defined close corporation when the same agreement would not be enforceable in a nonelecting corporation, it appears to have the advantage of enforceability as well as flexibility. 4°
In evaluating the ability of defined close corporations to stipulate the
qualifications of future shareholders, critics of the statute point to the
TBCA provision permitting the imposition of share transfer restrictions on
all corporations. 4 1 These provisions may theoretically have the same effect
by limiting the number and types of individuals to whom shares can later
be transferred. An assessment of this argument must include the recognition that the special abilities of one member of a close corporation are
often extremely important to the other members. 42 The ability of shareholders in a close corporation to control this variable directly seems more
desirable than indirect attempts using share transfer restrictions.
In considering the statutory close corporation's advantage of regulating
deadlock and dissolution, one can point to the availability of the general
dissolution provisions of the TBCA. 43 Commentators claim that the shareholder's option to call for a provisional director or the dissolution of the
company may be exercised at a time that is problematical for the close
corporation and other stockholders." This argument correctly notes a tactical consideration for the majority shareholders; however, it fails to recognize that the apparent purpose of the close corporation provisions is not to
ensure the convenience of the majority, but rather to protect the interests
of the minority. 45 This goal appears to be satisfied. Therefore, the liberal
provisions of the close corporation statute regulating dissent and dissolution appear to set out two more advantages over the general provisions of
the TBCA.
In summary, the current close corporation statute seems to provide the
members of electing closely held companies with somewhat greater operational latitude in the areas of shareholder management and agreements as
38. Id art. 2.30-1(A)(4).
39. "If an agreement authorized by this Article contains any provisions which would
not be valid under other provisions of the Act, such provisions shall be valid only so long as
the corporation maintains its status as a close corporation under this Act." 1d art. 2.302(D).
40. See F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 2.6, at 87-88.
41. See generally TBCA art. 2.22 (Vernon 1980).
42. Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313, 314
(1943).
43. See generally TBCA arts. 6.01-.07 (Vernon 1980).
44. See F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, §§ 2.1-.2, at 83.
45. Comment, supra note 5, at 728-30.
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well as in the regulation of dissent and dissolution. 4 6 Before considering
whether the actual exercise of these drafting techniques supports this conclusion, however, the methodology employed by this study is outlined.
II.

METHODOLOGY

The sample analyzed in this study consisted of 2,800 articles of incorporation filed with the Texas Secretary of State.4 7 Group 1 contained
1,400 articles processed between June 11, 1979, and June 15, 1979. Another
group of 1,400 articles processed between June 12, 1978, and June 16,
1978, was designated Group 2.48 Data was collected on the frequency with
which various drafting techniques were used in these articles in order to
assess the validity of the following theses: (1) Most TBCA corporations
possess a majority of the characteristics traditionally associated with the
defined close corporation; and (2) a significant number of all Texas corporations elect defined close corporation status in order to make full use of
the statutory provisions available solely to that business format.
This study focused on multimember corporations for profit that had
never undergone any merger activity. Therefore, any articles amended to
merge two corporations or filed to form either a nonprofit corporation or
an incorporated sole proprietorship were not analyzed.4 9 Incorporated
sole proprietorships were excluded from the sample on the theory that the
use of a corporate format by a single individual was not likely to involve
many of the drafting techniques pertinent to this study. Nonprofit corporations were excluded because such corporations in Texas are precluded
from electing close corporation status.50 Finally, articles of merger were
excluded on the basis that such articles ordinarily reflect concerns peculiar
to major changes in corporate form, rather than considerations normally
encountered upon original incorporation.
Applying this procedure excluded few mergers (Group 1: 4/1400 =
0.0029%), slightly more nonprofit corporations (Group 1: 22/1400 =
1.56%; Group 2: 82/1400 = 5.86%), and a relatively large number of incorporated sole proprietorships (Group 1: 279/1400 = 19.93%; Group 2:
285/1400 = 20.36%). Thus, the final number of corporations actually analyzed was 1,095 in Group 1, and 1,033 in Group 2. Of the 1,095 corporations ultimately constituting Group 1, 1,037 were nonelecting and 58 were
electing corporations. Of the 1,033 Group 2 corporations, 996 were
46. See Bateman, supra note 5, at 783; Comment, supra note 5, at 725.
47. See generally TBCA art. 3.03(A) (Vernon 1980) for filing procedures.
48. Two separate groups were used to assess differences in the drafting options used in
different time periods. As no significant differences were found, data from both groups will

be used jointly to support the conclusions reached in the text.

49. See general,y TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (Vernon 1980)
for the definition of "non-profit corporation" and the filing procedures applicable to such
corporations. An incorporated sole proprietorship is a corporation in which the roles of
incorporator(s), initial director(s), and registered agent are fulfilled by a single individual or
by his attorney. See generally Fuller, The IncorporatedIndividual: A Study of the One-Man
Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1371 (1938).

50. TBCA art. 2.01(A) (Vernon 1980).
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nonelecting and 37 elected close corporation status. The nonelecting corporations formed the relevant test groups for Thesis Number One, while
the electing corporation groups were the focus of Thesis Number Two.
A methodological limitation of this study stems from the fact that only
articles of incorporation on file with the secretary of state's office were
available for analysis. 5 1 Under Texas law, several drafting options that
may be included in these articles may also be included in either the corporate bylaws or in shareholder agreements.5 2 These collateral instruments
are matters of public record only if filed with the articles, and many share53
holders evidently prefer to preserve the privacy of these instruments.
Several factors nevertheless support the validity of this study's format.
First, other studies involving nonelecting corporations have used similar
methodology. 54 In addition, the approach selected strives to make the best
use of the available data. Finally, and most significantly, several important drafting options analyzed in this study must be included in the articles
of incorporation themselves to have the desired effect. 55 Thus, the results
of the present focus upon incorporators' actual exercise of drafting options
in their articles may be useful to those concerned with the viability of the
close corporation statute, despite the inaccessibility of agreements and bylaws.
III.

THESIS NUMBER ONE: MOST

TBCA

CORPORATIONS POSSESS A

MAJORITY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS TRADITIONALLY

ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEFINED CLOSE CORPORATION

A.

The Traditional Definition

Formulating a universally acceptable definition of the close corporation
has been a difficult task for both courts and commentators. 56 While commentators' interpretations of the statutory definitions vary, most agree that
5 1.

52.

See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., TBCA arts. 2.02(A)(16) (interested party provisions), 2.03(C)-(D) (limits

on repurchase of stock), 2.22(B) (share transfer restrictions), 2.24(A) (location of shareholders meetings), 2.24(C) (calling of special shareholder meetings), 2.30(A) (voting trusts),
2.30-2(B) (shareholder agreements), 2.32(A) (number, election, and removal of directors),
2.33(A) (classification of the board), 2.35(A) (quorum requirements for board meetings),
2.36(A) (delegation of various powers to the board), 9.10(B) (board consent to operate without formal meetings), 9.10(C) (use of telephone conferences as meetings) (Vernon 1980).
53. See INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-3; Bromberg, supra note 10, at
981 n.61(E).
54. See generally note 15 supra.
55. See, e.g., TBCA arts. 2.12(A) (authorization and classification of shares), 2.13(A)(7),
(stock series with differing voting rights), 2.22-1(A) (limitation of preemptive rights),
2.23(A) (control over adopted bylaws), 2.28(A) (quorum at shareholders' meeting),
2.29(A)(l)(a) (multiple or fractional shares), 2.29(D)(1) (voting of shares and cumulation),
2.30-1(B) (qualifications of shareholders), 2.30-1(G) (shareholder management), 2.305(A) (dissolution at will), 2.32(A) (number, election, and removal of directors), 3.02(A)(5)
(designation of classes of stock), 3.02(A)(6) (designation of preferred stock), 3.02(A)(8) (denial of preemptive rights), 3.02(A)(l 1) (registered office and agent), 3.02(A)(I 3) (incorporators), 9.08(A) (changes in required shareholder voting margins) (Vernon 1980).
56. Israels, The Close Corporationandthe Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948); Scott,
The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW. 741, 741 (1958).
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neither the economic worth nor volume of business of a corporation is
dispositive. 7 Although one could argue that any nonpublicly held corporation is closely held,58 this extremely broad definition does not add contour to the present inquiry because none of the analyzed corporations was
publicly traded.
A more useful definition might result from combining four characteristics traditionally associated with the close corporation: (1) the
size/function requirement that a small group of individuals attempts to
fulfill several, if not all, of the legally required corporate roles; 59 (2) the
transferability requirement that restricts the transferability of corporate
shares to outsiders;60 (3) the control element, by which a broad variety of
devices may be used to manipulate corporate operations; and (4) the protection element, by which these devices protect6 1 officers and directors from
the loss of financial or occupational security.
While all of these features may characterize a particular corporation, at
least one commentator has correctly noted that closely held corporations
need not possess all four.62 The commentators seem more concerned that
the company be organized and run by a small number of individuals
63
whose rights to transfer shares to corporate outsiders has been limited.
The term "closely held corporation" will, therefore, be used in Thesis
Number One to describe those corporations that, at a minimum, satisfy
both the size/function and the transferability requirements. The frequent
use of control devices or methods to protect corporate lenders will constitute additional support for Thesis Number One, but will not be considered
independently dispositive.
B.

The Size/Function Requirement

Two main investigations were pursued in order to test this requirement
under Thesis Number One. The first analyzed the extent to which the statutorily required roles of incorporator, director, and registered agent were
performed by the same individuals (the function aspect). The other considered the frequency with which different numbers of directors and incorporators were used (the size aspect). Data on this latter inquiry clearly
indicates that most nonelecting corporations are operated by a group of
individuals small enough to satisfy the size aspect of the size/function re57. See I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.03 (2d ed. 1971).
58. Scott, supra note 56, at 741.
59. See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence. Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.. 778 (1952); Symposium, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345 (1957).
60. See Kessler, Hooray(?)forthe Mode/Act-The 1969 Revision and the Close Corporation, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 746 (1970); Symposium, supra note 59, at 346; Winer, supra
note 42, at 330.
61. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. See generally O'Neal, supra note 27;
O'Neal & Janke, ControlArrangementsin Close Corporations,20 PRAc. LAW., Jan.1974, at
27.
62. Winer, supra note 42, at 314.
63. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 57, § 1.02; Israels, supra note 59, at 778-79; Scott,
supra note 56, at 744-48; Winer, supra note 42, at 314. This approach is also adopted by the
current Texas statute. See TBCA art. 2.30-1 (Vernon 1980).
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quirement. An overwhelming majority of these corporations used no more
than three incorporators (Group 1: 998/1037 = 96.24%; Group 2: 899/996
= 90.26%). 64 A very high percentage of nonelecting corporations also used
no more than three directors (Group 1: 921/1037 = 88.81%; Group 2:
896/996 = 89.96%).65
The function aspect of this initial requirement appears to be satisfied as
well. As suggested earlier, the greater the concentration of important roles
in the hands of a few, the more perfectly the corporation satisfies this facet
of the traditional close corporation concept. 66 Data on the activities of
both incorporators and directors reveals this type of concentration within
the nonelecting corporations surveyed. For example, at least one incorporator also served as the registered agent in a majority of the nonelecting
corporations studied (Group 1: 579/1037 = 55.83%; Group 2: 610/996 =
61.24%).67 This degree of overlap between the roles of registered agent
and incorporator, however, may not actually fulfill the size/function requirement. One possible explanation for this result is the fairly common
practice of having the attorney who files the articles of incorporation also
serve as the registered agent. 68 Because the primary function of the registered agent is to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation, this
practice suggests an un4erstandable willingness to leave legal matters to
69
legal counsel.
The degree to which incorporators also serve as initial directors is the
more probative inquiry with respect to the fulfillment of the size/function
criterion. According to traditional notions of corporate governance, incorporators bring the corporation into existence, but other individuals manage it. The data reveals a polarity of results, however, that does not
directly support this hypothesis. A majority of the nonelecting corporations used all of their incorporators on the initial board of directors
(Group 1: 601/1037 = 57.96%; Group 2: 598/996 = 60.04%).70 Yet the
percentage of corporations in which none of the incorporators served in
this dual role is also quite large (Group 1: 380/1037 = 36.64%; Group 2:
64. Data on the electing close corporations shows the same trend. Few used a corporate incorporator (Group 1: 1/58 = 1.72%; Group 2: 1/37 = 2.70%), while many used three
or fewer incorporators (Group 1: 48/58 = 82.76%; Group 2: 31/37 = 83.78%). See also
Hayes, Part I, supra note 15, at 440.
65. Since defined close corporations can be operated without a board of directors, see
note 16 supra and accompanying text, several corporations used this option (Group I: 24/58
= 41.38%; Group 2: 11/37 = 29.73%). The vast majority of the remaining defined close
corporations used no more than three directors (Group 1: 29/34 = 85.29%; Group 2: 24/26
- 92.30%).

66. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
67. The data on the defined close corporations reveals this same trend, but with more
impressive results (Group 1: 46/58 = 79.31%; Group 2: 30/37 = 81.08%).
68. The folder in which the secretary of state files approved articles of incorporation
includes the correspondence that accompanied the articles upon submission. The vast majority of those cover letters appeared to be from attorneys.
69. See TBCA art. 2.09, Comment (Vernon 1980).
70. Defined close corporations exhibited a more pronounced tendency to have all incorporators double as initial directors (Group 1: 29/34 = 85.29%; Group 2: 24/26 = 92.3 1%).
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371/996 = 37.25%). 7 1 The size of this latter category may appear to cast
some doubt upon the validity of Thesis Number One. This result, however, can best be understood by examining the usual role of the filing attorney. 72 Although no independent data was collected on this point, an
informal assessment suggests that many of these companies were incorporated by members of the filing attorney's law firm.73 Furthermore, the relatively minor role performed by the incorporator in preparing and filing
the articles of incorporation does not involve ongoing corporate management.

74

Besides those corporations with no incorporators on the initial board
because of attorneys' initial involvement in incorporation, most other
nonelecting corporations used all their incorporators as initial directors
(Group 1: 91.3%; Group 2: 95.6%). This result supports the contention
that most TBCA companies satisfy the function aspect of the first requirement in the traditional definition. While the evidence is not uncontrovertable, the results discussed in this section consistently depict the typical

nonelecting corporation as organized and managed by a small nucleus of
individuals who either perform the required corporate functions themselves or assign a few isolated tasks to individuals they believe to be better
qualified. This profile seems satisfactorily to capture the essence of the
size/function requirement.
C.

The TransferabilityRequirement

The second requirement of the traditional definition is the imposition of
restrictions on the transferability of corporate stock. 75 Texas corporations
may satisfy this requirement by imposing reasonable restrictions when
those limits are noted conspicuously on the stock certificates. 76 The statute
lists five such restrictions that would be enforceable if imposed. 77 The
data, however, indicates that none of these statutorily sanctioned options
71. Only a small percentage of the incorporators of the defined close corporations failed
to serve this dual role (Group 1: 5/34 = 14.71%; Group 2: 2/26 = 7.69%).
72. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
73. Accord, Bromberg, supra note 10, at 967 n.13(A); Hayes, Part I, supra note 15, at
412.
74. See TBCA art. 3.01(A), Comment (Vernon 1980).
75. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
76. TBCA art. 2.22(C) (Vernon 1980).
77. Article 2.22(D) of the TBCA provides:
[A] restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of securities of a corporation shall be valid if it reasonably:
(1) Obligates the holders of the restricted securities to offer to the corporation or to any other holders of securities of the corporation or to any other
person or to any combination of the foregoing, a prior opportunity, to be exercised within a reasonable time, to acquire the restricted securities; or
(2) Obligates the corporation to the extent permitted by this Act or any
holder of securities of the corporation or any other person, or any combination
of the foregoing, to purchase the securities which are the subject of an agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the restricted securities; or
(3) Requires the corporation or the holders of any class of securities of the
corporation to consent to any proposed transfer of the restricted securities or
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received much actual use. 78 Indeed, only two types of restrictions were
used at all. Articles giving the corporation or stated individuals the right
of first refusal were used infrequently in both groups (Group 1: 28/1037 =
2.70%; Group 2: 30/996 = 3.01%). 7 9 Prohibitions against transfers to specified persons were used sparingly and only in Group 1 (2/1037 = 0.19%).
One might conclude from this result that the transferability requirement
is not satisfied in nonelecting corporations. Many transferability restrictions, however, may be imposed either by the public articles of incorporation or by private documents such as bylaws and shareholder
agreements. 80 Nonetheless, based on the available data, few nonelecting
Texas corporations impose transferability restrictions in their articles. One
possible explanation for this result is that articles of incorporation tend to
be much more difficult to amend than bylaws or other corporate instruments that may contain transferability restrictions. Moreover, a pervasive
tendency exists to draft articles of incorporation as simply and broadly as
possible. For example, the overwhelming majority of the nonelecting corporations used perpetual duration provisions (Group 1: 1034/1037 =
99.71%; Group 2: 994/996 = 99.80%)8 1 and very broad purpose clauses
(Group 1: 676/1037 = 65.19%; Group 2: 797/996 = 80.02%).82 Thus, in
light of the opportunity to impose restrictions on transferability by other,
more private means, many nonelecting companies may use their articles of
incorporation to report
the minimum of nonsensitive information required
83
for incorporation.
to approve the proposed transferee of the restricted securities for the purpose
of preventing violations of federal or state laws; or
(4) Prohibits the transfer of the restricted securities to designated persons or
classes of persons, and such designation is not manifestly unreasonable; or
(5) Maintains the status of the corporation as an electing small business
corporation under Subchapter S of the United States Internal Revenue Code
or as a close corporation under this Act.
78. Accord, INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-19 n.140. But see Hayes,
PartIII, supra note 15, at 181. For a discussion of the use of the transferability and other
restrictions in defined close corporations, see text accompanying notes 110-12 infra.
79. For a discussion of an interesting use of such restrictions in a defined close corporation, see notes 124-26 infra and accompanying text.
80. See TBCA art. 2.22 (Vernon 1980).
81. The TBCA permits Texas corporations to use perpetual duration clauses. TBCA
arts. 2.02(A)(1), 3.02(A)(2) (Vernon 1980). But see Hayes, Part , supra note 15, at 441. See
also INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-5 n.23. All the defined close corporations used such clauses in their articles. Of those nonelecting corporations that did not seek
perpetual duration, three chose 50-year lives and the other two selected 99-year durations.
82. Texas corporations may also use very broad general purpose clauses. TBCA art.
3.02(A)(3) (Vernon 1980). In order to assess the extent to which this statutory license is
actually used, the author divided the articles into two groups: those with a general purpose
clause and those with a specific purpose clause. Articles in the specific purpose group were
sufficiently detailed to permit the reader to predict the company's main business activities
without being simply a form book recital of boilerplate. The remaining corporations were
placed in the general purpose category. Roughly the same percentage of defined close corporations as nonelecting corporations were classified as having general purpose clauses.
(Group 1: 41/58 = 70.69%; Group 2: 30/37 = 81.08%). But see Hayes, Part , supra note
15, at 441.
83. See, e.g., INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-3; Bromberg, supra note
10, at 981 n.61(E).
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The ControlElement

Unlike the transferability requirement, the control element is not strictly
required by the traditional definition. 84 The use of a broad variety of statutorily permitted control devices can nevertheless have a powerful impact
on the operation of the close corporation. 85 The issuance of several series
of common and/or preferred stock with different voting rights is one commonly suggested control tactic. 86 Yet most of the nonelecting corporations
surveyed had not chosen that approach in their articles. The vast majority
issued only one class of common stock (Group 1: 1007/1037 = 97.10%;
Group 2: 972/996 = 97.59%), while only an extremely small number issued either more than one series of common (Group 1: 20/1037 = 1.92%;
Group 2: 14/996 = 1.41%) or preferred stock (Group 1: 10/1037 = 0.96%;
Group 2: 10/996 = 1.00%).87
The data reveals only one attempt to use the issuance of stock as a
means of obtaining or retaining corporate control. All of the nonelecting
corporations that issued several series of common or preferred stock also
imposed different voting rights on those classes. 88 Although such an allocation of different voting rights among several classes of stock is an often
cited control device, 89 the use of only one class of securities by such an
overwhelming majority of nonelecting corporations is probably another
manifestation of the tendency to draft articles of incorporation as simply as
possible. 90
Texas law permits the use of a broad range of other methods to control
more directly the voting mechanism of the TBCA corporation. Yet the
data reveals that these techniques are rarely embodied in articles of incorporation. For example, none of the nonelecting corporations in either
group granted additional preemptive rights or enlarged the circle of indi84. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
85. Lebowitz, supra note 5, at 715.
86.
87.

See O'Neal, supra note 27, at 118.
None of the defined close corporations issued preferred stock; almost all used only

one series of common stock (Group 1: 56/58 = 96.55%; Group 2: 37/37
INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-14 n.92.

=

100%). See also

Interestingly, most electing and nonelecting corporations were found to issue predomi-

nately par value stock. Approximately 70% of those nonelecting corporations issuing only
one series of common stock issued par value stock (Group 1: 738/1018 = 72.49%; Group 2:
694/972 = 71.39%). All the corporations in Group 2 that issued several series of common
stock issued par value stock as did 90% of those in Group i. All of those nonelecting companies that issued preferred stock issued par value preferred. Similarly, the majority of the
defined close corporations that issued either a single series (Group 1: 39/56 = 69.64%;
Group 2: 26/37 = 70.27%) or several series of common (Group 1: 2/2 = 100%; Group 2:
0/37 = 0%) issued par value securities. See also INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15,

at A- 10 n.60. For a discussion of the capital structure of close corporations, see generally
Turley, Changing Capital Structures and Shareholders in a Closely-Held Texas Corporation,
11 Hous. L. REV. 351 (1974).

88. Both of the defined close corporations that issued several series of common stock
imposed different voting rights on each class. See also Hayes, Part IV, supra note 15, at 468.
89. See, e.g., O'Neal & Janke, supra note 61, at 27-28.
90. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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viduals who can call shareholder meetings. 9' Only one corporation imposed higher shareholder voting ratification margins (Group 1: 1/1037 =
0.09%), whereas sixty-one corporations relaxed these statutory requirements slightly (Group 1: 32/1037 = 3.09%; Group 2: 29/996 = 2.70%).92
The articles of two other corporations revealed the imposition of both
shareholder meeting quorum requirements that differed from the statutory
norm and the power to issue multiple or fractional shares (Group 2: 2/996
93
Other techniques were used somewhat more frequently, al= 0.20%).
though never by a majority of the companies. For instance, a small percentage of the nonelecting corporations limited corporate stock
repurchases to the amount of unrestricted capital and earned surpluses
(Group 1: 46/1037 = 4.44%; Group 2: 54/996 = 5.42%). One Group 2
corporation limited repurchases to the extent of capital surplus (1/996 =
0.10%), while four other charters imposed a single restraint based on
94
earned surplus (Group 1: 3/1037 = 0.29%; Group 2: 1/996 = 0.10%).
On the other hand, cumulative voting (Group 1: 257/1037 = 24.70%;
Group 2: 191/996 = 19.18%) and preemptive rights (Group 1: 216/1037 =
20.83%; Group 2: 149/996 = 14.96%) were denied in a fairly small proportion of cases. 95
Although the articles do not indicate a pervasive use of these techniques,
the data suggests one tendency. The infrequent use of provisions that increase the list of those empowered to call shareholders' meetings or permit
a lower shareholder quorum requirement suggests little willingness to permit the expansion of minority shareholder power, at least through provisions in articles of incorporation. Where utilized, these voting controls
apparently are designed to limit the impact of minority shareholders on
corporate management. An obvious embodiment of this trend can be seen
in the denial of cumulative voting because this ability to combine votes is
an attractive means of achieving minority representagenerally considered
96
tion on the board.
Additional evidence of the tendency to confine minority shareholders'
power can be found in an analysis of the restrictions on the general activities of corporate officials. If nonelecting corporations, like electing corporations, attempt to concentrate control in the hands of their initial officers
91. None of the defined close corporations granted these additional rights either. But
see Hayes, Part IV supra note 15, at 471-72.
92. The defined close corporations rarely modified the shareholder approval margins
statutorily required to ratify dissolutions, mergers, or amendments to the articles of incorporation. Only two in Group 1 (2/58 = 3.45%) relaxed the voting requirement to a simple
majority while one in Group 2 (1/37 = 2.70%) imposed voting requirements higher than the
two-thirds norm. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
93. In contrast, none of the defined close corporations granted the authority to issue
multiple or fractional shares or imposed different quorum requirements. See also Hayes,
Part IV, supra note 15, at 474-75.
94. None of the defined close corporations used any of these restrictions.
95.

All the defined close corporations that denied preemptive rights also denied cumu-

lative voting (Group 1: 5/58 = 8.62%; Group 2: 7/37 = 18.92%). See INCORPORATION
PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-12 n.78.

96. Eg., Symposium, supra note 59, at 376.
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and directors, one would suspect that those individuals' corporate power
97
would not be restricted. This pattern is, in fact, what the data reveals.
None of the articles proscribed board actions without formal meetings or
through telephone conferences. Only one corporation imposed board quorum requirements different from the statutory norm (Group 2: 1/996 =
0.10%) and a few delegated to an executive committee several of the full
board's powers (Group 1: 8/1037 = 0.77%; Group 2: 3/996 = 0.30%).
E.

The Protection Element

Because the bulk of the power to control both nonelecting and electing
corporations is concentrated in the hands of a few, those controlling individuals might reasonably seek to include in the articles provisions that protect themselves and the corporation from adverse effects that their
decisions may have. Specifically, corporate officers and directors presumably would want the articles to include indemnification and interested party
provisions. The directors would also seek protection from removal without cause. The data suggests that these presumptions have some basis in
fact. Indemnification provisions appeared in a modest percentage of the
articles of nonelecting corporations (Group 1: 159/1037 = 15.33%; Groups
2: 137/996 = 13.76%) and interested party provisions appeared about as
frequently (Group 1: 134/1037 = 12.92%; Group 2: 137/996 = 13.76%).98
The use of provisions regulating the removal of directors, on the other
hand, was almost negligible, as only three companies in Group 1 permitted
removal with or without cause (3/1037 = 0.29%). 99 On the whole, therefore, few corporations provided significant protection to corporate officials
through the provisions of their articles of incorporation.
F. Conclusion
The data collected under the size/function element of Thesis Number
One clearly supports that initial requirement. Consistent with the traditional close corporation model, the typical Texas nonelecting corporation
is managed by a rather confined nucleus of individuals.1°° In other respects, however, the data provides less support for the theory that nonelecting Texas corporations possess most of the traditional close corporation
characteristics and management options. Specifically, few nonelecting corporations drafted articles either limiting the transferability of corporate
shares, 10 imposing strict control over internal corporate affairs,10 2 or pro97. None of the defined close corporations studied imposed any of the permitted restrictions on the general power of the officers and directors.
98. Very few of the defined close corporations employed either indemnification (Group
1: 4/58 = 6.89%; Group 2: 0/37 = 0%) or interested party provisions (Group 1: 0/58 = 0%,
Group 2: 2/37 = 5.41%). See also INCORPORATION PLANNING, supra note 15, at A-21
n.150; Hayes, Part V supra note 15, at 597.
99. None of the defined close corporations imposed a provision dealing with the removal of a director. See also Hayes, Part V supra note 15, at 598-99.
100. See notes 64-74 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 75-83 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 84-97 supra and accompanying text.
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viding protection to corporate officers and directors.' 0 3 Yet the weight of
nonempirical authority suggests that such provisions receive frequent use
in nonelecting corporations. 104 In light of the probable use of other, more
private means of imposing these sensitive provisions, 0 5 one may reasonably infer that nonelecting Texas corporations enjoy many of the control
options traditionally associated with the close corporation format.
IV.

THESIS NUMBER Two: A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ALL TEXAS

CORPORATIONS ELECT DEFINED CLOSE CORPORATION STATUS IN

ORDER TO MAKE FULL USE OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

AVAILABLE SOLELY TO THAT BUSINESS FORMAT

As mentioned earlier, many commentators have counseled against the
use of the defined close corporation despite the additional control options
available to electing companies. 106 The second principal area of inquiry of
this study, therefore, is to determine the frequency with which Texas corporations elect the statutory close corporation format and the extent to
which they utilize the additional options. If that choice is made very infrequently, consideration should be given to possible statutory changes that
enhance the utility of that business association.
Contrary to Thesis Number Two, only a small percentage of the analyzed corporations elected the defined close corporation status (Group 1:
58/1095 = 5.59%; Group 2: 37/1033 = 3.71%). 107 The inaccessibility of
related corporate documents had no impact on this result, as Texas corporations wishing to utilize the close corporation provisions must expressly
elect that status in their articles of incorporation. 0 8
Interestingly, eight of the articles surveyed expressly stated that they did
not elect statutory close corporation status (Group 1: 5/1095 = 0.4%;
Group 2: 3/1033 = 0.3%). This express denial could reflect an underlying
animosity toward the statutory format. Alternatively, the figures may reflect the erroneous belief that all Texas corporations automatically qualify
as statutory close corporations unless expressly denied. An earlier version
of the statute provided for this result.' 0 9 Given the express provisions of
the current statute, however, the initial interpretation seems more feasible.
The data also discloses an unwillingness to use the full statutory freedom available in the operation of the defined close corporation. A fairly
large percentage of these companies made use of shareholder management
provisions (Group 1: 24/58 = 41.38%; Group 2: 11/37 = 29.73%), but
103. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text,
104. For insights into drafting these provisions, see generally Bromberg, supra note 10, at

961-1005; Pelletier & Marsh, IncorporationPlanningin Texas, 23 Sw. L.J. 820 (1969).
105. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Shapiro, The Statutory Close Corporation.-A Critique anda CorporatePlanning
Alternative, 36 MD. L. REV. 289, 290 n.I 1 (1976). But see F. ELLIOT & R. HAMILTON, supra
note 5, § 2.1; Hayes, PartIII,supra note 15, at 159; Lebowitz, Corporations,Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 86, 153 (1972).
108. See TBCA art. 2.30-l(A)(1) (Vernon 1980).
109. See Doty & Parker, supra note 5, at 1018; Lebowitz, supra note 5, at 715.
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none imposed qualifications on future shareholders. Very few gave their
shareholders the right to dissolve the company at will (Group 1: 5/58 =
8.62%; Group 2: 3/37 = 8.11%). These results strongly suggest that few
defined close corporations use any of these three options because each
must be included in the articles of incorporation. 0 In addition, very few
electing corporations chose to file shareholder agreements with their articles."' For example, only two Group 1 corporations filed agreements relating to the distribution of profits and future directors or officers (2/58 =
3.45%). Three corporations were to be operated like partnerships (Group
1: 3/58 = 5.17%), while only one charter restricted the transfer of stock so
as to retain subchapter S status (Group 1: 1/58 = 1.72%).112
In summary, the data suggests a reluctance to elect the defined close
corporation format. The concomitant widespread refusal to include provisions listing qualifications for future stockholders, the election of shareholder management, or the optional dissolution of the corporation in these
articles further indicates that those companies that do use the defined close
corporations format do not use it as completely as possible.
V.

PROPOSED STATUTORY REFORM

The data collected on Thesis Number Two indicates that most Texas
corporations do not elect the close corporation format, and that electing
companies do not take full advantage of the management flexibility provided by the statute. These results are especially disheartening in view of
prior legislative efforts to update the close corporation statute in order to
afford special treatment to electing companies.' 13 Given the apparent reluctance to use the close corporation format, the Texas Legislature might
pursue one of two approaches in order to further this legislative purpose.
First, the legislature could retain the statute's present location in article 2 if
substantial effort is made to reduce the perceived complexity of the current
provisions.' 4 TBCA article 2.30-1 (A) has been particularly criticized for
its rather cumbersome structure." 5 To remedy this problem, the legislature should make that section more comprehensible by incorporating subheadings or dividing it into several separate subsections. This change
would have no substantive effect on the election of the defined close corporation status; however, it would be consistent with the1 6underlying desire
for simplicity in drafting the articles of incorporation.
Preferably, the legislature could consider adopting an entirely new version of the close corporation statute. Two drafting programs provide po(Vernon 1980).
111. See id art. 2.30-2(B).
112. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379. A related tax planning technique is to elect treatment as "Section 1244 stock." I.R.C. § 1244. Although none of the defined close corporations chose this
status, a small number of nonelecting companies did (Group 1: 18/1037 = 1.74%; Group 2:
110. See TBCA arts. 2.30-1(B), (G), -5(A)

14/996 = 1.41%).
113. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 661, at 25; Bateman, supra note 5, at 781-82.

114. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 10, at 188.
115. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 697, at 39; Hamilton, supra note 10, at 188.
116. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
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tential sources for this new statute. First, the American Bar Assocation
(ABA) is currently redrafting the Model Business Corporation Act; 17 in
conjunction, the Corporate Law Committee of the Corporation, Business
and Banking Law Section of the ABA has drafted a proposed statutory
118
close corporation supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act.
The currently proposed draft defines a statutory close corporation as one
that includes a provision in its articles stating that it is a statutory close
corporation. 119 The draft would permit existing nonelecting corporations
to amend their charters in order to make such an election and would allow
existing defined close corporations to renounce that status so long as dissident shareholders have the option to sell out at a fair price. 120 The articles
of incorporation could include provisions calling for management without
a board of directors or granting certain shareholders the option to dissolve
the corporation either at will or upon the happening of a stated contingency or event. 12 1 As under the current Texas statute, shareholder agreements could regulate a broad variety of internal corporate affairs.122
Similarly, the draft would permit shareholders to obtain various judicial
remedies such as the appointment of a provisional director or corporate
dissolution. 123
The draft also includes several new and potentially useful provisions.
First, shareholders who receive offers to sell their shares to corporate out124
siders must first offer the shares to the corporation on the same terms.
Secondly, the heirs or the estate of a shareholder can offer the shareholder's shares for sale to the corporation. 125 If the corporation fails to
voluntarily purchase these shares, the heirs or estate can obtain a judicially
imposed involuntary purchase. 126 The proposed method of enforcement
dissolve the corporation if it failed to comply
would permit the court to
127
with the purchase order.
Although the ABA's draft embodies several useful proposals, the Texas
Legislature should place special emphasis on the suggestions advanced by
a select subcommittee of the Texas State Bar Association's Committee on
the Revision of Corporation Law. This subcommittee, formed in 1979,
consists of legal scholars and practitioners who recognize the need for a
simpler enabling statute granting greater freedom of contract to the share117. Interview with Seth Searcy, Project Director of the Model Business Corporation Act
Redrafting Project, University of Texas School of Law (Aug. 20, 1980).

118. Interview with Professor Harry J.Haynsworth, University of South Carolina School
of Law (Aug. 22, 1980).

119. ABA COMM. ON CORPORATION LAW, SECTION ON CORPORATION, BUSINESS AND
BANKING LAW, PROPOSED STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT TO THE MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (June

120. Id §§ 3(b), 8.

121. Id §§ 11, 16.
122. Id § 12.
123. Id § 17.

124. Id §4.

125. Id § 15.
126. Id
127. Id

1, 1980).
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holders of Texas close corporations. 128 The subcommittee's proposed bill,
if enacted, would be codified as a new article of the TBCA and would
replace existing provisions elsewhere in the Act. 129 Under the Texas State
Bar subcommittee's proposal, a close corporation is defined as one that
declares that status in its articles of incorporation. 130 This declaration
would be the only procedural difference between forming a close corporation and an ordinary corporation.' 3 ' Thus, as under the current statutory
format, consistent provisions of the TBCA would govern the operation of
close corporations as well. 132 The proposal also permits previously
nonelecting corporations to come under the new statute if the shareholders
unanimously agree. 133 Corporations organized under the existing close
corporation statute would retain that status provided their stock certificates
were changed to note the increased risk and stock transfer restrictions associated with the close corporation format. 134 Currently enforceable share35
holder agreements would also remain effective under the new provision.1
While this approach admirably reduces the complexity of electing the
close corporation format, provisions on the use of shareholder agreements
emphasize the drafters' further intent to enhance the freedom of these
36
shareholders to arrange contractually the operations of their companies. 1
The recommendation lists several matters that could be governed by shareholder agreements. 137 While this list is neither exhaustive of all variations
of shareholder agreements nor innovative in stating types of arrangements
not permitted under the current TBCA, it does attempt to delineate the
broad freedom of contract that the shareholders of a close corporation may
enjoy. 138 One interesting point must be made on the use of shareholder
agreements under this plan. Future shareholders, even those who
128. The members of the committee are Messrs. W. Amon Burton of Austin; Michael M.
Boone, George W. Coleman, Marc H. Folladori, Gary Herman, John T. Kipp, Harold F.
Kleinman, David G. McLane, George Slover, Jr. of Dallas; and Professors Hal Bateman,
Texas Tech Law School; Alan R. Bromberg, Southern Methodist University Law School;
and Chairman Leon Lebowitz, University of Texas Law School.
129. SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLOSE CORPORATION PROVISIONS OF THE TEXAS BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT, COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF CORPORATION LAW, SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PROPOSED TEXAS CLOSE
CORPORATION LAW (July 3, 1980) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED TEXAS CLOSE CORPORA-

TION LAW]. [Author's note: After this Article went to print, further amendments were made
in this proposal.]
130. Id art. 12.02.
131. Id art. 12.13(A).
132. Id art. 12.03(B).
133. Id art. 12.14.
134. Id. arts. 12.15(A), (C), .51(A).
135. Id art. 12.15(B).
136. Id art. 12.32(A).
137. Article 12.32(B) lists: (1) shareholder management, (2) buy-sell agreements, (3) declaration of dividends or division of profits, (4) dissolution at will or upon the happening of a
given event, (5) the use of voting trusts, (6) the use of shareholder voting margins that differ
from the statutory norms, (7) the use of per capita voting, (8) employment of shareholders,
directors, and officers, (9) the disclosure of names of the persons who will serve in those
offices, (10) arbitration, (11) qualification of future shareholders, and (12) the process for
amending the shareholder agreements.
138. Compare TBCA art. 2.30--2 (Vernon 1980) with PROPOSED TEXAS CLOSE CORPORATION LAW, supra note 129, art. 12.32(B).
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purchase an interest in the company without actual knowledge of its shareholder agreements, would be bound by those previously executed documents. 13 9 These agreements may restrict the right of subsequent
shareholders to participate in the management of the corporation but may
not limit these individuals' rights to receive dividends or to inspect the list
of shareholders. 140 Although this provision may seem to restrict the contractual freedom of subsequent shareholders, it must be read in conjunction with the requirement that a transferor attach copies of applicable
shareholder agreements to his stock certificates before a transfer can be
effective.' 4 1 Thus all subsequent shareholders would receive constructive
notice of the agreements, and the rights of the original parties thereto
would be preserved.
The provision regulating the governance of these companies expressly
acknowleges the validity of operations with less stringent observance of
traditional corporate formalities. 142 As under the current statute, these
corporations may be governed either by directors or by shareholder management. 14 3 One key difference in the state bar committee's proposal,
however, is that the election of shareholder management may be made in
collateral shareholder agreements rather than in articles of incorporation. 144 While the scheme for attaching all such agreements to the stock
certificates before transfer may be sufficient notification of the election of
this option, retaining the current requirement of including this election in
the articles would be preferable. This latter approach would enhance the
probability of actual notice to future shareholders, without inhibiting the
operation of the company. This method seems the more desirable, in view
of the fact that managing shareholders generally are subject to traditional
director liabilities. 145
The state bar subcommittee's proposal also suggests several methods for
handling dissent and dissolution. Shareholders may request judicial relief
if a breach of the close corporation agreements is imminent, rather than
waiting until after the fact.14 6 They may seek the appointment of a provisional director under circumstances substantially similar to those available
under the current statute. 4 7 Alternatively, they may demand the appointment of a receiver-custodian or ask for judicial dissolution of the corpora139. PROPOSED TEXAS CLOSE CORPORATION LAW, supra note 129, art. 12.34(A).

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id
Id art. 12.51(C).
Id art. 12.35(C).
Id art. 12.31.

144. Compare TBCA art. 2.30-1(G) (Vernon 1980) with PROPOSED TEXAS CLOSE CORPORATION LAW, supra note 129, art. 12.32(B)(1).
145. See PROPOSED TEXAS CLOSE CORPORATION LAW, supra note 129, art. 12.35(A)(2).
146. IdI art. 12.62(A).

147. Id art. 12.64 and TBCA art. 2.30-4(A) (Vernon 1980) both provide for the appointment of a provisional director when those empowered to manage the corporation have
reached such a state of deadlock that the affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally.
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tion.148 As judicial remedies are not exclusive, the proposal lists several
ways in which close corporation status can be terminated. 149 Termination

may occur upon the occurrence of events listed in either the articles or
bylaws, upon the amendment of the articles, or upon the merger or consolidation of the company. 150
VI.

CONCLUSION

Many practitioners and observers view the statutory close corporation as
a potentially useful device for obtaining the limited liability of a corporation without sacrificing the flexibility in management and freedom of contract traditionally associated with partnerships. The present study depicts
the typical Texas corporation as a small group of active corporate participants in whom the responsibilities of ownership and management merge.
The data reveals less support for the traditional notion that most closely
held corporations impose stock transfer restrictions, use a broad range of
control devices, and provide significant protection for corporate management. This result is perhaps best explained by the availability of other,
more private means for imposing those provisions. The most surprising
result, however, is that so few corporations elect and fully use the defined
close corporation format.
In view of recent legislative attempts to improve the close corporation
statute, Texas lawmakers are likely to be surprised and disappointed by
this very infrequent use of the statutory close corporation format. This
Article therefore has explored the viability of two proposed statutory revisions. The American Bar Association proposal is particularly useful in
granting the corporation a right of first refusal and the heirs of current
shareholders a call option on their shares. The proposal of the subcommittee of the Texas Bar Association, on the other hand, provides a simplified
procedure for acquiring statutory close corporation status and broader judicial remedies. Whatever the source for reform, the results of this study
indicate the need for further legislative action to encourage greater use of
the statutory format. With the options available to it, the Texas Legislature is in a position to make an informed decision on the next stage in the
evolution of the close corporation.
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